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Abstract: This paper studies the impact of corruption on inward foreign direct investment using a 
unique firm-level data set.  It examines two effects of corruption simultaneously: a reduction in 
the volume of foreign investment and a shift in the ownership structure. Corruption makes local 
bureaucracy less transparent and hence acts as a tax on foreign investors. Moreover, corruption 
affects the decision to take on a local partner. On the one hand, corruption increases the value of 
using a local partner to cut through the bureaucratic maze. On the other hand, corruption 
decreases the effective protection of investor’s intangible assets and lowers the probability that 
disputes between foreign and domestic partners will be adjudicated fairly, which reduces the 
value of having a local partner. The importance of protecting intangible assets increases with 
investor’s technological sophistication, which tilts the preference away from joint ventures in a 
corrupt country. Empirical evidence shows that corruption reduces inward FDI and shifts the 
ownership structure towards joint ventures. Technologically more advanced firms are found to be 
less likely to engage in joint ventures. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  
Most developing countries and former centrally planned economies are eager to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI).  Hence, understanding the determinants of FDI is 
important in practice as well as in theory.  Moreover, for many countries, a primary 
benefit of FDI is the inflow of technological know-how of the foreign investor.  As the 
technological content of a given FDI is closely related to the ownership mode of the 
investor (e.g., joint venture vs. sole ownership), it is also useful to understand the 
determinants of the ownership mode.  In this paper, we study a particular determinant of 
FDI, namely host country corruption, that has received relatively less attention in the 
literature on FDI but is crucial in practice.  While it is difficult to quantify precisely, 
casual empiricism would suggest that the cross-country variation in corruption level is 
probably as large as the variations in corporate tax rate or labor cost, two commonly 
emphasized determinants of FDI. 
The issue of corruption has become a prominent item on the agenda of international 
institutions and national governments.
1 The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which was signed in 
1997 and went into effect in February 1999, criminalizes bribery of foreign officials by 
firms from member countries. Yet indices produced by organizations such as 
Transparency International suggest that corruption is still a widely spread phenomenon.  
In this paper, we examine the consequences of corruption on cross-border direct 
investment.  More specifically, we look into two separate effects of corruption 
simultaneously: a possible reduction in the volume of foreign investment and a possible 
shift in the ownership structure. 
The literature on FDI is too vast to be comprehensively referenced here (see Caves, 
1982, Froot, 1993, Balasubramanyam et al. 1996).  A subset of the literature uses firm-
level data to examine the choice of entry mode (for example, Kogut and Singh, 1988; 
Blomström and Zejan, 1991; Asiedu and Esfahani, 1998; Smarzynska, 2000).   A few 
papers have investigated the impact of corruption on FDI.  This is a relatively new area of 
interest, with principal contributions from Hines (1995), Henisz (2000) and Wei (2000a 
and b).  Hines (1995) was the first paper that reported a negative effect of corruption on William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
  2
foreign investment.  His sample was, however, restricted to U.S. multinational firms.  As 
Hines (1995) pointed out, because U.S. had been until recently the only major source 
country criminalizing bribery to foreign government officials, the effect of corruption on 
U.S. multinational firms may not be representative of the effect on the universe of foreign 
investors.  Henisz (2000) was the first to study both the FDI market entry and ownership 
mode (e.g., joint venture vs. wholly owned firms).  His sample was also restricted to U.S. 
multinational firms, and hence could also be non-representative of the universe of 
multinational firms.  Furthermore, Henisz examined market entry and ownership mode 
separately rather than simultaneously.  These two decisions could potentially be inter-
related.  In terms of statistical results, the estimated coefficients on corruption in Henisz’s 
paper were mostly not significantly different from zero or with a paradoxical sign in the 
sense that higher corruption appeared to be associated with more FDI.  Wei (2000a and b) 
used a data set on FDI that went beyond U.S. multinationals, but the data were 
aggregated at a bilateral national level rather than at a firm level.  As a consequence, it 
could not study ownership mode and entry decisions of the multinational firms. 
We believe that it is time to revisit this important question by putting various 
ingredients together.  We use a unique firm-level data set encompassing multinational 
firms from both the U.S. and other countries, which will allow us to examine whether 
host country corruption discourages investment by foreign firms for reasons beyond 
investors’ fear of legal penalty in the home country.  In fact, we will check explicitly 
whether U.S. investment behaved systematically differently from firms from other source 
countries.  In this regard, the paper will examine issues that could not be examined in 
Hines (1995) and Henisz (2000).   
The particular firm-level data that we use allows us to investigate the effect of 
corruption in terms of firms’ decision not to enter a particular market rather than in terms 
of reduced bilateral investment flows.  If a foreign investor faces a fixed cost associated 
with entering a new country, then the reduction in foreign investment could be larger 
when the number of firms is reduced than when per firm investment is lower.  In this 
regard, this paper can provide insight beyond Wei (2000a and b) that rely on bilateral 
aggregate FDI data only.  Finally, in terms of the econometric approach, this paper will 
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also differ from Henisz (2000) by examining the effects of corruption on ownership mode 
and market entry simultaneously. 
We view our paper not only as a study on the determinants of FDI, but also as a 
check on the usefulness of existing measures of corruption.  Given that corruption is 
elusive to measure but important conceptually, it is useful to derive and test more 
nuanced predictions of the economic consequences of corruption, such as its effect on the 
composition of FDI.  This could help increase our confidence that popularly used 
measures of corruption are indeed meaningful and informative. 
In this paper, we study how the volume of foreign direct investment and its 
ownership structure may be affected by the extent of corruption. Corruption makes 
dealing with government officials to obtain, for example, export licenses and production 
permits, less transparent and more costly, particularly for foreign investors.  In this case, 
having a local partner lowers the transaction cost (e.g., the cost of securing local permits). 
At the same time sharing ownership may lead to technology leakage.
2 Both costs of local 
permits and losses from technology leakage are positively related to the extent of 
corruption in a host country. When corruption level is sufficiently high no investment 
will take place. When corruption is low enough so that investment can take place, the 
foreign investor with more sophisticated technology prefers a wholly-owned form, but, 
holding the technological level constant, the investor is more inclined to have a local 
partner in a more corrupt host country. 
We test these hypotheses using a unique firm-level data from transition 
economies.
3 Our main results can be briefly summarized as follows.  We show that the 
probability of investment taking place is negatively related to the extent of corruption in a 
host country.  Conditional on FDI taking place, the data suggests that  foreign investors 
are more likely to take on a local joint venture partner in a corrupt host country, possibly 
to save on the transaction cost of dealing with local government officials.  Under one set 
of point estimates, a decrease in corruption incidence from the level found in Azerbaijan 
                                                 
2 Smarzynska (2000) shows empirically that foreign investors with more sophisticated technologies are less 
likely to share ownership than investors possessing fewer intangible assets. She attributes this finding to 
concerns about knowledge dissipation that would lead to a greater loss in the case of investors with more 
sophisticated technologies. 
3 Our data set is unique in the extent of its coverage. Previous studies on the choice of entry mode use data 
on FDI originating in one and usually less major source country (i.e., Sweden in the case of Blomström and 
Zejan, 1991, or the United States in the case of Henisz, 2000) or FDI entering a single host country William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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to that prevailing in Estonia is associated with an increase in the probability of investment 
from 4 to 19 percent.  Conditional on FDI taking place, the same amount of reduction in 
corruption is associated with an increase in the probability of investment taking the form 
of a wholly-owned subsidiary (rather than a joint venture) from 24 to 44 percent.  
However, other things equal, the data shows that foreign investors with more 
sophisticated technologies are more likely to retain full ownership of their projects rather 
than to engage in joint ventures.  There is some limited evidence suggesting that this 
effect is stronger in more corrupt host countries. 
Hines (1995) suggested that US multinationals behave differently than investors of 
other nationalities, namely, they tend to avoid joint ventures in corrupt countries. This 
behavior is likely to be a consequence of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
which stipulates penalties for executives of American companies whose employees or 
local partners engage in paying bribes. We find support for this view and show that US 
companies are more likely than investors from other countries to retain full ownership in 
corrupt countries, even though they are not less likely to undertake FDI in corrupt 
economies in an absolute sense than firms from other source countries. 
We organize the rest of the paper in the following way.  Section II presents a 
minimalist model that highlights the effects of corruption on foreign direct investment.  
Section III discusses the data and the econometric model and presents the empirical 
results.  Section IV concludes. 
 
II. A MINIMALIST MODEL 
While the paper is primarily an empirical investigation, we present a simple model 
here to motivate the subsequent tests on corruption and the FDI. Let qk be the corruption 
level in host country k defined over the interval [0, ∞] and tj the level of technological 
sophistication of foreign investor j, also defined to be in the interval [0, ∞]. Note that 
where no confusion arises, we will drop the subscripts for simplicity. 
The value of setting up a wholly owned firm to the foreign investor is: 
   ) ( ) ( k wo wo q C V wo U − =  
                                                                                                                                                 
(typically the United States as in the case of Kogut and Singh, 1988; Asiedu and Esfahani, 1998). Our data 
set covers investment projects undertaken in twenty-two economies by investors from all over the world.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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where ) (q Cwo  is the cost of securing the local permits when not having a local partner.
4 
We assume that this cost increases with the corruption level in the country: 
   0 ) ( ' > q C wo      
and   0 ) 0 ( = wo C  
 
The value of setting up a joint venture to the foreign investor is: 
   ) ( ) , ( ) ( k jv k j jv q C q t L V jv U − − =  
where ) , ( k j q t L  is the technology leakage function and  ) (q C jv is the cost of securing the 
local permits to the foreign investor having a local partner. We assume that leakage is 
more likely in countries with a higher level of corruption and the cost of leakage 
increases with the sophistication of technology owned by the foreign investor. Thus, 
   0 , 0 > > q t L L , 0 > tq L  
   0 ) , 0 ( = q L  
We also assume that the cost of obtaining a local permit increases with corruption level. 
0 ) ( ' > q C jv  
0 ) 0 ( = jv C  
However, we assume further that as corruption rises, the cost of acquiring local permits 
increases faster for a foreign investor pursuing a wholly-owned firm than one with a local 
joint venture partner. 
) ( ' ) ( ' q C q C wo jv <  
For simplicity, we choose specific linear functional forms for  ) , ( q t L , ) (q Cwo  and 
) (q C jv , that satisfy the conditions stated above, with an eye on yielding a parsimonious 
expression that can be estimated econometrically. 
 Let cq C jv =  
   q c Cwo ) ( θ + =  
   tq t q t L φ γ + = ) , ( 
                                                 
4  We use the label “local permits” to represent a variety of local inputs whose acquisition costs may rise as 
the local bureaucracy becomes less and less transparent. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
  6
where c, θ, γ and φ are positive constants. With these assumptions, the value of a wholly-
owned investment project equals 
   q c V wo U wo ) ( ) ( θ + − =    
And the value of a joint venture is 
   cq tq t V jv U jv − − − = φ γ ) ( 
We will assume that Vwo ≥ VJV, as it seems plausible.  However, our key conclusion 
regarding the effect of corruption on the composition of FDI does not depend on this 
assumption. 
The investor would consider setting up a wholly-owned project in a host country if 
U(wo) > 0, or q <  Vwo / (c + θ).  Likewise, she would consider engaging in a joint 
venture if U(jv)>0, or q < (VJV - γt) / (c + φt). 
The foreign investor would choose a wholly-owned project over a joint venture if 
and only if  ) ( ) ( jv U wo U >  or 
   cq tq t V q c V JV wo − − − > + − φ γ θ) ( 
Rearranging the terms, we obtain 
  
q
q V V
t
wo JV
φ γ
θ
+
+ −
>
) (
 
The solution is best represented in Figure 1, where the investment decision is 
mapped out in a two-dimensional space along the level of corruption in the host country 
and the level of technological sophistication of the investing firm. When corruption level 
q is sufficiently high, no foreign investment in any ownership form would take place. 
Conditional on foreign investment taking place, the foreign investor would prefer a 
wholly-owned form if its technology is sufficiently sophisticated. On the other hand, 
holding the level of technological sophistication constant, the higher the corruption (up to 
a limit), the more inclined the foreign investor is to set up a joint venture. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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Figure 1: FDI Decision as a function of local corruption and firm’s technology 
 
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this section, we report the statistical evidence on the connection between 
corruption and foreign direct investment.  We describe the empirical work in three steps: 
(1) the econometric specifications, (2) some key variables (their measures and sources, 
with more details in a separate appendix), and (3) the regression results and their 
interpretations. 
 
Econometric Spefications 
 
Specification 1: A Single-equation Probit Approach 
To start with, we use a single equation to investigate the impact of corruption on 
the decision of multinational firms to enter a host country. Let FDIjk be a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if firm j chooses to invest in host country k, and zero 
otherwise. We assume that the firm undertakes the FDI project if and only if a latent 
variable, FDIjk
*  is positive.  The latent variable depends on a vector of factors including 
the level of corruption in host country k, denoted by qk.  In other words, 
0 
FDI
No
θ + c
V wo
C
VJV
θ
JV wo V V − Corruption in  
host country  k q  
Foreign 
investor’s 
technological 
sophistication 
index tj 
Joint 
Ventures
Wholly-
owned Firms William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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kj k jk jk
jk
jk jk
q X ε γ β + + =
=
> =
*
*
FDI
where
otherwise    0 FDI
0 FDI   if   1 FDI
 
qk = corruption level in country k, Xjk =  vector of determinants of FDI* other than 
corruption, and β (vector) and γ are parameters.  In the subsequent discussion and in the 
regression tables, we label the last equation on FDI* as the “FDI entry equation.” 
 
Specification 2: A System-of-Equations Double-Probit Approach 
The above specification focuses on the entry decision: should a firm enter a host 
country with a particular set of characteristics?  In reality, in which mode a firm enters a 
host country (joint venture vs. sole ownership) may not be independent from its decision 
on whether to enter or not.  Both decisions may be affected by the host country’s 
corruption level and other characteristics.  To allow for this general possibility, we also 
adopt a system-of-equation approach that consists of two parts. The first part, involving 
the investor’s decision on whether to enter a particular host country, k, is identical to the 
latent-variable approach described above.  The second part describes the investor’s 
decision on the choice between wholly-owned form versus joint venture, conditional on 
FDI taking place.  
  We describe the second part more precisely here.  Let OWNERSHIPjk be a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the foreign investment by firm j takes the 
wholly-owned form in host country k (conditional on the investment taking place), and 
zero if the investment is a joint venture.  Wholly-owned form occurs if and only if 
another latent variable, OWNERSHIP*jk, is positive.  
In other words, 
kj j k jk jk
jk jk
jk jk
t q W
where
υ δ δ θ + + + =
> ≤ =
> > =
2 1
*
jk
*
jk
*
OWNERSHIP
0 * FDI   and   0 OWNERSHIP   if      0   OWNERSHIP
0 * FDI   and   0 OWNERSHIP   if      1   OWNERSHIP
 
tj is an index of technological sophistication for firm j, W is a vector of determinants of 
the ownership structure other than host country’s corruption and foreign investor’s 
technological sophistication, θ (vector), δ1 and δ2 are parameters to be estimated.  In William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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subsequent discussion and in the regression tables, we label the last equation on 
OWNERSHIP* as the “ownership mode equation.” 
  Assuming that (ε, ν) are i.i.d normal variables with zero means and a correlation 
coefficient of ρ, we estimate these equations simultaneously by maximum likelihood 
(probit with sample selection), correcting standard errors for correlation between 
observations for the same host country. In principle, the number of observations in the 
FDI decision equation will be equal to the number of firms in the sample, multiplied by 
the number of destination countries covered by our data set. This, however, would result 
in a large number of zeros on the left hand side, as many firms in our sample have not 
undertaken any investment projects in the region.  Since a large number of zeros may be 
problematic, we restrict our attention to firms with at least one investment project.  In the 
ownership decision equation, the number of observations is equal to the total number of 
FDI projects in the sample.  Obviously, the latter number is smaller than the former 
because not all firms invest in all countries. 
In terms of the parameterization described above, the central hypotheses that we 
seek to test are the following: 
(a) Corruption discourages foreign direct investment, i.e., γ < 0, in the FDI entry 
equation; 
(b) Conditional on FDI taking place and holding constant the technological level 
of the foreign investor, corruption encourages the joint venture form (or discourages the 
sole ownership), i.e., δ1 < 0, in the ownership decision equation; 
And (c) conditional on FDI taking place, a more technologically advanced firm is 
more likely to adopt a wholly-owned form, i.e., δ2  > 0 in the ownership decision 
equation. 
 
Data 
 
Foreign Direct Investment Data 
Our empirical work employs a unique firm-level data set based on a survey 
conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  In January 1995, 
a brief questionnaire was sent out to all companies listed in the Worldscope database to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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inquire about investment projects in transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe.
5 
Responses were obtained from 1,405 firms.  381 respondents had actually invested and 
further 70 firms planned to invest in the region.
6  To avoid a large number of zeros on the 
left-hand side, we only utilize the information on those 451 firms that decided to invest in 
at least one country in the region.
7  Further, we exclude firms in service sectors and 
extractive industries since they are likely to be subject to restrictions on the extent of 
foreign ownership, which leaves us with the final sample of 262 firms.  The distribution 
of projects across the host countries as well as the list of source countries is presented in 
Table 1.
 
 The survey inquired about the form of the project: a joint venture with a local 
partner (JV), acquisition or greenfield. For the purposes of this study, we treat all projects 
not associated with JVs as wholly owned.  The questionnaire did not ask for the exact 
ownership shares between foreign and local partners for joint ventures, nor the timing nor 
the size of the investment, which is unfortunate for us. Since inflows of FDI were 
negligible prior to 1989, the investments covered in our sample took place (or were 
planed to take place) between 1989 and 1995.
8  
 
Measures of Corruption 
A key regressor in our analysis is a host country’s corruption level. Corruption, by 
its very nature, is difficult to measure precisely. There are a few measures available “on 
the market,” all of which are subjective perceptions.
9  There are four types of such 
indices. The first is based on surveys of individual “experts” (typically every country is 
rated by one expert).  Popular examples of this type include the Business International 
(BI) Index used in Mauro (1995), Wei (1997 and 2000a) and others, and International 
                                                 
5 Worldscope is a commercial database that provides detailed financial statements, business descriptions, 
and historical pricing information on thousands of public companies located in more than fifty countries. 
6 It is assumed that firms that perceived the survey as more relevant, i.e., having invested or planning to 
invest in the region, were more likely to have answered the survey.  At least for firms that invested in 
Poland – the largest destination for FDI in the sample, there is no systematic difference between firms that 
answered the survey with those that did not in terms of size (proxied by asset value and sales), ratios of 
advertising expenditure or R&D to total sales, share of foreign owned assets in total firm assets, or share of 
foreign sales in total sales (Smarzynska, 1999). 
7  We have also done the analysis with all the firms and found qualitatively the same results.  
8 “Several CEECs [Central and Eastern European countries] had already allowed minority foreign 
participation in joint ventures in the 1970s and 1980s, but this opportunity was not attractive enough to 
foreign investors. Except for a few showpieces, foreign investment started to flow only after the 
transformation to market economy had been launched” (Hunya, 1997, p. 286).  
9 See Wei (1999) for a discussion of the various corruption indices. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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Country Risk Group (ICRG) index used by, for example, Ades and Di Tella (1999) and 
Wei (2000a). The second type is based on surveys of firms. Typically multiple firms per 
country are surveyed, and the average answer for each country is used as the value of 
corruption index for that country.  Relative to the first type, this type of indices reduces 
the impact of the idiosyncratic errors of individual respondents. Most popular indices of 
this type include the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) index by the World 
Economic Forum and the World Development Report (WDR) index by the World Bank.  
Both GCR and WDR indices were used in Kaufmann and Wei (1999).  The third type is 
to pool together information from several existing indices by averaging or other statistical 
extraction methods.  The a widely known index of this type is the one compiled by the 
Transparency International (TI), an international non-governmental organization 
dedicated to fighting corruption.  To correct several methodological shortcomings of the 
TI index, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) developed a different composite 
corruption index from existing indices using an unobserved component method. 
Unfortunately, many of these indices such as the BI, GCR and ICRG indices, do not 
cover enough transition economies to be useful for our examination. 
In this paper, we use three corruption indices that have adequate coverage of the 
transition economies. The first one is the WDR index, which is based on a survey 
undertaken in 1996 by the World Bank in preparation of the World Development Report 
1997.  The survey covered 3,866 firms in 73 countries. The rating is based on the 
response to Question 14 which asked: “Is it common for firms in my line of business to 
have to pay some irregular, ‘additional’ payments to get things done?” The respondents 
were asked to rate corruption on a 1 to 6 scale with 1 denoting “always” and 6 “never.” 
To facilitate interpretation of the results we re-scaled the variable in the following way: 
re-scaled WDR index = 7 – original WDR index. Thus, a higher value corresponds to a 
higher level of corruption.  The main advantage of this index is that it is based on a 
consistent methodology and data collected by the same source. 
The second measure is based on the information obtained by Peter Neumann 
(1994), a journalist at a German business publication Impulse, from people with business 
experience in each host country, mainly German exporters. He interviewed on average 
ten individuals (or minimum three) per country with a guarantee of strict confidentiality. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
  12
The measure is supposed to indicate the proportion of the transactions that involved 
corrupt payments.
10  
The third corruption measure was compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton (KKZ) and is described in detail in their 1999 publication.  Basically, their 
composite corruption extracts information from seventeen different sources. To do this, 
they assume that the available individual corruption ratings reflect both some true but 
unobserved level of corruption and sampling variations and perception errors.  The 
unobserved “true” level of corruption can be backed out statistically (assuming a linear 
unobserved component specification).  The resulting estimates of corruption range from   
–2.5 to 2.5, with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.  The higher the estimate 
for each country, the less corrupt and better governed the country. Again, for this paper, 
we re-scale the index so that a higher value corresponds to a higher level of corruption.
11 
The three measures of corruption are presented in Table 3.   Note that each measure 
has its own advantages and disadvantages.  The WDR index comes from a single survey; 
hence the underlying methodology is more uniform across countries.  On the other hand, 
the KKZ measure utilizes information from many more sources than WDR, hence, 
idiosyncratic errors from any particular data source may be mitigated.  The Neumann 
index was constructed in 1994 and therefore is “pre-determined” relative to the 
information on FDI (derived from a 1995 survey).  It is also supposed to be more 
“objective.”  However, the timing of the Neumann index is probably not a huge 
advantage as the relative rankings of corruption levels across countries are unlikely to 
change very much in a five year span.  For example, the International Country Risk 
Group (ICRG) corruption index covers eight countries in our sample.  The Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients for these countries are 0.98 between the 1994 and 1996 
values, and 0.94 between the 1994 and 1998 values, respectively.  Hence, as far as these 
countries are concerned, the relative rankings are fairly stable in the 1990s.  The actual 
values of the Neumann index reported in Column 4 of Table 2 suggest that it also 
involved subjective judgment rather than a true tabulation of the fraction of (German) 
exports with corrupt payments.  Given the relative comprehensiveness of the KKZ index 
and its well-documented statistical methodology, we think that the KKZ index is 
                                                 
10 Neumann’s index was used by Ades and Di Tella (1997). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
  13
probably the best of the three.   For complete disclosure, in the subsequent analyses, we 
will report results with all three measures. 
 
Other data issues 
Note that our estimation would produce a negative sign on the corruption variable 
if corruption per se was not affecting the choice of entry mode but its level was positively 
correlated with the restrictions on the extent of foreign ownership. To the best of our 
knowledge, however, in none of the countries in the sample there exists legislation 
specifically forbidding full ownership by foreign investors.  For instance, in the USSR a 
presidential decree issued as early as October 1990 allowed foreign wholly owned 
companies to be established in the form of branches or subsidiaries. The decree also 
created the legal basis for foreign investors to buy out existing Soviet enterprises as these 
were privatized (McMillan 1996, p. 50). In Hungary, Act XXIV of 1988 on the 
Investment of Foreigners in Hungary allowed non-Hungarian companies to own equity 
up to 100% (WTO, 1998). In Poland, the 1988 Law on Economic Activity with the 
Participation of Foreign Parties permitted 100 per cent foreign equity participation 
(GATT, 1992). 
In many transition economies, however, FDI in sectors such as production of 
military equipment and extraction of natural resources has been subject to restrictions on 
the extent of foreign ownership.
12 Therefore, we exclude firms in these sectors including 
coal, gas and oil industry from our sample. Since service sectors tend to be more 
restricted than manufacturing, we focus on firms in manufacturing sectors only. 
Another crucial variable in our regressions is a measure of investor’s technological 
sophistication.  We follow the literature in constructing a standard proxy, namely, the 
ratio of a firm’s R&D expenditure to the value of sales. Technological sophistication has 
been shown to be positively correlated with the probability of investment taking place 
(see references in Dunning, 1993) and negatively associated with the probability of 
investment project being a joint venture (Asiedu and Esfahani, 1998; Smarzynska 2000).  
Since the literature on FDI stresses the importance of all intangible assets, not just those 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 The KKZ index can be viewed as a more sophisticated and improved version of the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions index. 
12 See Dunning and Rojec (1993) for a description. 
13 The figures for R&D intensity and other firm specific variables come from the Worldscope database. See 
the Appendix for more details. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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related to technologies, as an alternative to technological sophistication we use investor’s 
advertising intensity proxied by selling, general & administrative expenses as a 
percentage of sales.
14 The figures on both measures as well as other firm specific 
variables come from the Worldscope database.  
Additionally, we control for firm size, production diversification and the distance 
between home and host countries.  As larger firms have more resources, they are more 
likely to engage in FDI.  Similarly, firms with less diversified production structure may 
be forced by competitive pressures in their home countries to search for new markets.  
Unfamiliarity with the market and its legal/institutional environment is likely to increase 
with the physical distance, thus the costs associated with undertaking FDI are likely to be 
higher for more distant host countries.
16  Moreover, Blomström and Zejan (1991) suggest 
that larger firms are more likely to take higher risks and thus more often choose full 
ownership. Their empirical results, however, lead to the opposite conclusion.  Stopford 
and Wells (1972) point out that more diversified firms may be more tolerant towards 
minority ownership and thus more likely to engage in JVs, which is confirmed by Meyer 
(1998). Finally, Kogut and Singh (1988) show that cultural distance is positively related 
to the probability of a JV, which suggests that a local partner is more useful in less 
familiar environment. 
The FDI decision equation also includes several additional regressors, such as a 
host country’s GDP, GDP per capita and a measure of openness to trade and corporate 
tax rates in the host country. We expect to find that the probability of investment is 
positively related to the market size (GDP) and purchasing power of local consumers 
(GDP per capita) and negatively correlated with tax rates.
17  
All variables are described in more detail in the Appendix, while summary statistics 
are listed in Table 3.  Firm size, GDP, GDP per capita, distance and openness enter the 
model in logarithmic form. 
                                                 
14 This measure was employed by, for instance, Stopford and Wells (1972) and Asiedu and Esfahani 
(1998). 
15 There is also another reason why firms investing heavily in advertising may want to seek full ownership. 
A JV partner may have a strong incentive to free ride on the reputation of a foreign partner by debasing the 
quality of the product carrying the foreign trademark. In such a case, the local partner appropriates the full 
benefits of debasement while bearing only a small fraction of the costs (Caves, 1982). 
16 See Markusen (1995) for a survey of FDI determinants. 
17 Because of data constraints, we use statutory tax rates even though effective tax rates might be more 
appropriate. However, Wei’s (1999) findings indicate that substituting the former tax rates with the latter 
has a negligible effect on the results. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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Preliminary Results – FDI Entry Decision Alone 
We report first the single-equation probit estimation that focuses solely on the 
investors’ decision to enter a host country. Table 4 presents the estimation results with 
each column corresponding to a regression employing a different corruption measure.  
In the first three columns, we use a firm’s ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales as 
a proxy for its relative technological rank.  We find that foreign investors that are large, 
have a less diversified production structure and possess more intangible assets are more 
likely to invest in transition economies. Large domestic market and smaller distance to 
investor’s home country are correlated with a greater likelihood of investment. GDP per 
capita, openness to trade and corporate tax rate do not appear to have a statistically 
significant effect in most cases. 
More essential for the current paper, we find that corruption in a host country is 
always negatively associated with the probability of foreign investment for all three 
measures of corruption. However, this effect is statistically significant only when 
corruption is proxied by the WDR and KKZ indices.  
In the last three columns, we use a firm’s advertising intensity – the ratio of its 
advertising expenditure to its total sales – as a measure of its technological leadership.  
The basic results are very similar to those in the first three columns.  In particular, host 
country corruption is always negatively related to the probability of a multinational firm’s 
entry into the market.  Of the three measures of corruption, WDR and KKZ indexes of 
corruption are statistically significant.  In other words, the notion that host country 
corruption deters foreign firms from entering the market finds some support in our data. 
It may be useful to provide a quantitative assessment of the corruption effect.  For 
illustration, we use the point estimate in Column 3 (when corruption is measured by the 
KKZ index).  A decrease in corruption incidence from the level found in Azerbaijan 
(high) to that prevailing in Estonia (quite low) is associated with an increase in the 
probability of foreign investment from 4 to 19 percent.  Given that there are many other 
factors influencing the FDI entry decision, this estimated effect is not trivial. 
 
Joint Estimation of the FDI Entry and the Ownership Mode Effects 
  As we argued earlier, the effects of corruption on FDI entry and on ownership 
mode decisions are better estimated jointly using the two equations described as William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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Specification 2 before.  The estimation results are presented in Table 5.  Each column in 
the table represents the result of a different maximum likelihood estimation.  The 
coefficient estimates from the FDI entry decision equation are reported in the top panel of 
the table, while the coefficient estimates from the ownership mode equation are in the 
lower panel.  Similar to Table 4, a firm’s technological leadership is proxied by its R&D 
intensity in the first three columns and by its advertising intensity in the last three 
columns.  
As one can see from the top panel of Table 5, the results of the FDI entry decision 
are broadly consistent with those in Table 4.  In particular, the corruption variable always 
enters with a negative sign, and is statistically significant in four out of the six 
regressions.  Hence, the data suggests that host country corruption is likely a deterrent to 
foreign investment. 
Our subsequent discussion will focus on the lower panel of the table, where the 
results on the ownership mode decision are reported. We find that the coefficient on 
corruption is always negative and statistically significant in three out of six regressions. 
The negative sign is consistent with the hypothesis that corruption encourages a foreign 
investor to form a joint venture with a local partner (possibly to save on the transaction 
cost in dealing with government officials).  The coefficients on measures of the foreign 
investor’s technological sophistication are positive and significant at the one percent level 
in all regressions, suggesting that firms with better technology or more established brand 
names are more reluctant to use local partners, which supports the hypothesis that 
concern for technological leakage in a joint venture grows with the firm’s degree of 
technological sophistication.  
We can again illustrate the quantitative magnitude of the corruption effect on the 
ownership structure using the point estimate in Column 3  (when corruption is measured 
by the KKZ index).  A decrease in corruption level from the level found in Azerbaijan 
(high) to that prevailing in Estonia (quite low) is associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of a wholly-owned foreign investment, conditional on FDI taking place.   
More precisely, the probability of foreign investment adopting the form of a wholly-
owned subsidiary increases from 25 to 44 percent.  If we use the WDR corruption index 
instead (Column 1 in Table 5), the probability of a wholly-owned foreign investment 
increases from 27 to 44 percent. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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In Table 6, we also examine the interplay between corruption incidence and 
investors’ intangible assets by including the interactive term between firms' technological 
sophistication (or advertising intensity) and host country corruption in the ownership 
mode equation.  A positive sign on the interaction term would be consistent with the 
following hypothesis:  foreign investors are generally more inclined to form joint 
ventures in a corrupt country, but their interest in joint ventures decreases with their level 
of technological sophistication because of the concern that intellectual property 
protection becomes problematic in a more corrupt country.   
The results presented in Table 6 give limited (weak) support to this hypothesis.  
The interaction term bears a positive sign in five out of six regressions but it is significant 
only in one instance.  However, in regressions that do not include the measures of 
technological level or advertising intensity by themselves, the coefficient on the 
interactive term is positive and statistically significant in all cases (not reported to save 
space). 
Do U.S. investors behave differently from investors from other countries?  As 
mentioned at the beginning of the paper, Hines (1995) suggests that (before the OECD 
anti-bribery treaty went into effect in 1999) US multinationals were more likely to avoid 
joint ventures in corrupt countries than investors of other nationalities. To test this 
hypothesis, we include in both equations a dummy variable for US investors and an 
interaction between the dummy and corruption level. The results are presented in Table 7.  
We find no evidence that American firms invest less in corrupt countries, which is 
consistent with the results of Wei (2000a). We find, however, some evidence that while 
US companies tend to be more interested in joint ventures than investors from other 
countries, they are indeed more averse to joint ventures in corrupt host countries (this is 
consistent with Hines, 1995). The interaction between the US dummy and the corruption 
measure bears a positive and significant coefficient in three out of six regressions. Under 
the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, American investors are legally liable (and 
thus can be fined or jailed) if their local joint venture partners pay bribes, and this might 
have induced them to engage less in joint ventures. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper studies how a foreign investor’s decision to undertake FDI and the 
choice of the entry mode are affected by the extent of corruption in a host country. 
Corruption makes local bureaucracy less transparent and hence adds to the cost of doing 
business.  Moreover, corruption affects the decision to take on a local joint venture 
partner. On the one hand, corruption increases the value of a local partner to a foreign 
investor.  On the other hand, foreign investors with sophisticated technology may worry 
about leakage of technological know-how or its misuse by joint venture partners and are 
thus less inclined to form a joint venture.  
We test these hypotheses using a firm-level data set on FDI in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union in the 1990s.  The data provides some support to these 
hypotheses.  In addition, we find that, other things equal, American investors are 
somewhat more reluctant to form joint ventures in more corrupt countries, possibly 
because of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. 
  For joint venture firms, our data set does not have information on the exact 
ownership shares between foreign and local partners.  It may be useful in the future to 
work out the effect of corruption on majority- versus minority-owned joint ventures and 
test it with some more refined data.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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APPENDIX  
Firm specific variables used in the empirical analysis come from Worldscope which 
is a commercial database providing detailed financial statements, business descriptions, 
and historical pricing information on thousands of public companies located in more than 
fifty countries. They pertain to 1993 or the closest year for which the information was 
available and refer to worldwide operations of each firm. Below we present a more 
detailed description of the variables. 
 
   Firm R&D intensity: measured by R&D expenditure as a percentage of net sales.  
Source: Worldscope  
   Firm advertising intensity: measured by selling, general & administrative expenses 
as a as a percentage of net sales.  Source: Worldscope  
   Firm size: measured by a firm’s sales in millions of US dollars. Source: Worldscope 
   Production diversification: measured by the number of four digit SIC codes 
describing a firm’s activities. Source: Worldscope 
   GDP and GDP per capita: data for 1993. Source: EBRD (1994) 
   Corruption WDR Index: WDR rating is based on the response to question 14 in the 
WDR survey which asked: “Is it common for firms in my line of business to have to 
pay some irregular, “additional” payments to get things done?” The respondents 
were asked to rate corruption on a 1 to 6 scale with 1 denoting “always” and 6 
“never.” To facilitate interpretation of the results we rescaled the variable in the 
following way: rescaled WDR = 7 – original WDR. Thus, higher values correspond 
to a higher level of corruption.  Source: The World Bank, unpublished. 
   Corruption KKZ Index: Composite index based on 194 measures of governance 
from seventeen different sources.  See KKZ (1999) for a detailed description. 
Rescaled KKZ index = 2.5 – original KKZ index.  Source: KKZ, 1999. 
   Corruption Neumann Index: The proportion of exports by certain German firms to a 
host country that involved corrupt payments. The index value of 1 corresponds to 
10% of transactions involving corrupt payments, 2 to 20%, etc.  Source: Neumann 
(1994). 
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   Distance: logarithm of distance in kilometers between the capital cities. The primary 
source is Rudloff (1981), supplemented by Pearce and Smith (1984).  In the case of 
following countries the average distance from the main cities was used: Argentina 
(Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Rosario), Australia (Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne), Canada 
(Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal), Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhni 
Novogorod). The data for Nizhni Novogorod is from 
http://www.unn.runnet.ru/nn/whereis.htm. For the United States Kansas City, 
Missouri was used, for Netherlands De Bilt, Slovakia Poprad, Switzerland Zurich. 
Distances between Taiwan and other countries are from Shang-Jin Wei’s NBER web 
site: www.nber.org/~wei. 
   Openness: the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. The average value for 
1991-95 has been used. Source: The World Bank’s WDI database. 
   Corporate tax rate: in percentages; if several rates apply, the highest one was used. 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECTS BY HOST COUNTRY 
Host country 
No of JV projects in 
the sample 
No. of wholly owned 
projects in the sample 
Total no. of projects in 
the sample 
     
Albania  3 1 4 
Azerbaijan 1 1 2 
Belarus  5 3 8 
Bulgaria  16 13 29 
Croatia 7  4  11 
Czech 55  53  108 
Estonia  16 8 24 
FYR  Macedonia  2 1 3 
Georgia  4 2 6 
Hungary  50 48 98 
Kazakhstan  10 6 16 
Latvia  13 6 19 
Lithuania 8  5  13 
Moldova  2 0 2 
Poland 84  51  135 
Romania  21 12 33 
Russia 83  31  114 
Slovak  Republic  26 19 45 
Slovenia  13 5 18 
Turkmenistan  1 0 1 
Ukraine  20 5 25 
Uzbekistan  5 1 6 
TOTAL  445 275 720 
 
Source countries (listed in the decreasing order of importance in the sample): United 
Kingdom, United States, Germany, France, Finland, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, 
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Australia, Italy, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Brazil, Malaysia, South Africa and South Korea. 
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TABLE 2. CORRUPTION MEASURES 
WDR KKZ  Neumann 
Albania             3.5    
Azerbaijan  4.6           3.5   6 
Belarus  4.2           3.2   4 
Bulgaria  4.6           3.1   4 
Croatia             3.0   4 
Czech Republic  2.8           2.1   4 
Estonia  2.2           1.9   2 
Macedonia, FYR  3.1           3.0   8 
Georgia  4.2           3.2   4 
Hungary  2.6           1.9   6 
Kazakhstan  4.3           3.4   4 
Latvia  3.9           2.8   4 
Lithuania  3.3           2.5   0 
Moldova  4.2           2.9    
Poland  3.1           2.0   4 
Romania             3.0   6 
Russian Federation  3.8           3.1   8 
Slovak Republic  4.1           2.5   4 
Slovenia             1.5   2 
Turkmenistan             3.8   4 
Ukraine  3.4           3.4   4 
Uzbekistan  4.4           3.5   4 
Mean  3.7 2.8    4.3 
Source: see the Appendix William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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 TABLE 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable  No. of obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
GDP   22  21,391  41,029 
GDP per capita   22  1,429  1,471 
WDR Corruption Index   18  3.7  0.7 
KKZ Corruption Index   22  2.8  0.6 
Neumann Corruption Index  20  4.3  1.9 
Corporate tax rate  21  29.5  6.5 
Distance between source and host countries 7,752  5,314  3,412 
Firm size   252  3,375,906  11,000,000 
Production diversification   255  4.6  2.0 
Firm Technological Intensity  158  3.2  3.6 
Firm Advertising Intensity  173  19.7  11.5 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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TABLE 4. CORRUPTION AND ENTRY DECISION: SINGLE-EQUATION PROBIT 
   WDR  Neumann  KKZ     WDR  Neumann  KKZ 
Firm size  0.135***  0.124*** 0.126***   0.184*** 0.167***  0.169***
 (0.023)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.023)
Production diversification  -0.077***  -0.079*** -0.077*** -0.062*** -0.069*** -0.061***
 (0.022)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016)  (0.015)
Firm R&D intensity  0.032***  0.036*** 0.036***  
 (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009)  
Firm advertising intensity  0.014*** 0.013***  0.014***
   (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002)
GDP    0.452***  0.536*** 0.616*** 0.412*** 0.516***  0.575***
 (0.056)  (0.109) (0.081) (0.043) (0.098)  (0.078)
GDP per capita  0.096  -0.037 -0.381** 0.059 -0.044  -0.421***
 (0.070)  (0.114) (0.150) (0.054) (0.096)  (0.132)
Corruption -0.190***  -0.011 -0.552***   -0.277*** -0.043  -0.648***
   (0.056)  (0.053) (0.155)   (0.054) (0.047)  (0.149)
Distance -0.343***  -0.381*** -0.337*** -0.331*** -0.367***  -0.316***
 (0.060)  (0.066) (0.059) (0.058) (0.064)  (0.054)
Corporate tax  0.006  -0.008 -0.005 0.006 -0.015  -0.008
 (0.006)  (0.015) (0.010) (0.006) (0.013)  (0.007)
Openness 0.218*  0.214 0.398 0.035 0.030  0.219
 (0.130)  (0.340) (0.281) (0.106) (0.351)  (0.281)
Intercept -5.420***  -5.113** -3.302** -4.676*** -4.633**  -2.475
 (1.160)  (2.147) (1.687) (1.079) (2.216)  (1.579)
          
Log likelihood  -857.9  -990.2 -1000.6  -895.5 -1035.9  -1041.4
No. of obs.  2808  2964 3276  3060 3230  3570
Chi
2 788.9  449.5 518.6  1150.1 492.2  444.0
Prob > Chi
2 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00
Pseudo R
2  0.30 0.25 0.27  0.30 0.23 0.26
                       
Standard errors corrected for clustering for host countries are listed in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, 10% level, respectively
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TABLE 5. CORRUPTION, ENTRY AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE: A JOINT ESTIMATION 
   WDR  Neumann  KKZ     WDR  Neumann  KKZ 
FDI ENTRY EQUATION                
Firm size  0.135*** 0.124*** 0.126***   0.184***  0.167***  0.169***
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)
Production diversification  -0.077*** -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.062*** -0.069*** -0.061***
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.015)
Firm R&D intensity  0.032*** 0.036*** 0.036***    
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)    
Firm advertising intensity  0.014***  0.013***  0.014***
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP    0.451*** 0.529*** 0.617*** 0.412***  0.513***  0.575***
 (0.060) (0.110) (0.081) (0.045)  (0.098)  (0.078)
GDP per capita  0.099 -0.025 -0.382** 0.059  -0.0389  -0.423***
 (0.077) (0.117) (0.150) (0.060)  (0.099)  (0.132)
Corruption -0.189*** -0.009 -0.553***   -0.277***  -0.042  -0.650***
   (0.056) (0.053) (0.155)   (0.0540)  (0.048)  (0.149)
Distance -0.342*** -0.379*** -0.337*** -0.331***  -0.367***  -0.316***
 (0.060) (0.066) (0.058) (0.058)  (0.064)  (0.054)
Corporate tax  0.006 -0.008 -0.005 0.006  -0.014  -0.008
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.007)
Openness 0.215 0.196 0.399 0.035  0.023  0.221
 (0.136) (0.340) (0.281) (0.107)  (0.350)  (0.281)
Intercept -5.419*** -5.070** -3.301** -4.675***  -4.621**  -2.466
   (1.161) (2.161) (1.684)   (1.070)  (2.224)  (1.565)
OWNERSHIP MODE EQUATION                       
Firm size  0.038 -0.006 0.025   0.120***  0.116***  0.136***
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.032)
Production diversification  -0.068*** -0.051*** -0.062*** -0.049** -0.042*  -0.047**
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.020)
Firm R&D intensity  0.082*** 0.079*** 0.091***    
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)    
Firm advertising intensity  0.040***  0.038***  0.040***
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Corruption -0.193 -0.111*** -0.350***   -0.130  -0.058  -0.264**
   (0.132) (0.040) (0.114)   (0.133)  (0.045)  (0.131)
Distance 0.057 0.118 0.074 -0.066  -0.054  -0.068
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.083) (0.075)  (0.082)  (0.074)
Intercept -0.597 -0.271 -0.462 -1.595**  -1.625**  -1.671**
 (0.515) (0.421) (0.459) (0.714)  (0.764)  (0.691)
Rho -0.038 -0.306*** 0.023   0.003  -0.116  0.060
   (0.180) (0.091) (0.096)   (0.171)  (0.111)  (0.107)
No. of obs.  2808 2964 3276  3060  3230  3570
    censored  2360 2484 2791  2614  2754  3089
    uncensored  448 480 485  446  476  481
Chi
2  97.88 101.28 80.06 338.88  155.00  227.53
Prob > Chi
2 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Log Likelihood  -1136.2 -1284.0 -1296.5   -1168.0  -1325.6  -1331.6
Standard errors corrected for clustering for host countries are listed in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, 10% level, 
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TABLE 6. JOINT ESTIMATION WITH INTERACTION TERMS. 
 WDR  Neumann  KKZ    WDR  Neumann  KKZ 
FDI ENTRY EQUATION            
Firm size  0.135*** 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.184***  0.167*** 0.169***
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023)
Production diversification  -0.077*** -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.062*** -0.069*** -0.061***
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017)  (0.016) (0.015)
GDP    0.451*** 0.529*** 0.617*** 0.412***  0.513*** 0.575***
 (0.060) (0.110) (0.081) (0.045)  (0.098) (0.078)
GDP per capita  0.099 -0.026 -0.382** 0.059  -0.039 -0.424***
 (0.077) (0.117) (0.150) (0.060)  (0.099) (0.132)
Firm R&D intensity  0.032*** 0.036*** 0.036***  
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)  
Firm advertising intensity  0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014***
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Corruption -0.189*** -0.009 -0.553***   -0.277***  -0.042 -0.651***
   (0.056) (0.053) (0.155)   (0.054)  (0.048) (0.149)
Distance -0.342*** -0.379*** -0.337*** -0.331***  -0.367*** -0.316***
 (0.060) (0.066) (0.058) (0.058)  (0.064) (0.054)
Corporate tax  0.006 -0.008 -0.005 0.006  -0.014 -0.008
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006)  (0.013) (0.007)
Openness 0.214 0.195 0.398 0.035  0.023 0.221
 (0.137) (0.341) (0.281) (0.107)  (0.350) (0.281)
Intercept -5.419*** -5.068** -3.301** -4.675***  -4.621** -2.464
 (1.161) (2.162) (1.684) (1.070)  (2.224) (1.563)
OWNERSHIP MODE EQUATION    
Firm size  0.038 -0.004 0.025 0.120***  0.116*** 0.132***
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.036) (0.032)
Production diversification  -0.068*** -0.052*** -0.062*** -0.049** -0.042** -0.044**
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021)  (0.021) (0.019)
Firm R&D intensity  0.060 0.104*** 0.046         
   (0.054) (0.031) (0.054)         
Firm R&D * Corruption  0.006 -0.005 0.017         
   (0.015) (0.005) (0.021)         
Firm advertising * Corruption          0.000  0.000 0.017*
          (0.010)  (0.002) (0.009)
Firm  advertising  intensity        0.040  0.037*** 0.001
          (0.031)  (0.012) (0.020)
Corruption -0.218 -0.090** -0.426***   -0.129  -0.063 -0.643**
   (0.145) (0.038) (0.147)   (0.312)  (0.061) (0.252)
Distance 0.057 0.112 0.075 -0.066  -0.053 -0.066
 (0.084) (0.088) (0.084) (0.075)  (0.081) (0.075)
Intercept -0.510 -0.370 -0.261 -1.597  -1.598** -0.753
 (0.436) (0.397) (0.434) (1.194)  (0.747) (0.900)
Rho -0.042 -0.293*** 0.017 0.003  -0.117 0.067
 (0.1808) (0.092) (0.097) (0.171)  (0.107) (0.106)
No. of obs.  2808 2964 3276 3060  3230 3570
    censored  2360 2484 2791 2614  2754 3089
    uncensored  448 480 485 446  476 481
Log likelihood  -1136.16 -1283.83 -1296.22 -1168.04  -1325.62 -1329.87William Davidson Institute Working Paper 494 
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TABLE 7. ARE US INVESTORS DIFFERENT?  JOINT ESTIMATION 
   WDR  Neumann  KKZ     WDR  Neumann  KKZ 
FDI ENTRY EQUATION             
Firm size  0.132*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.181*** 0.163***  0.165***
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.023)
Production diversification  -0.065*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.058*** -0.066*** -0.060***
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014)  (0.014)
Firm R&D intensity  0.032*** 0.037*** 0.037***  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
Firm advertising intensity  0.013*** 0.013***  0.013***
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP    0.459*** 0.536*** 0.613*** 0.420*** 0.515***  0.571***
 (0.057) (0.106) (0.078) (0.042) (0.093)  (0.074)
GDP per capita  0.085 -0.065 -0.363** 0.045 -0.069  -0.408***
 (0.077) (0.120) (0.156) (0.059) (0.098)  (0.133)
Corruption -0.163*** 0.003 -0.480***   -0.263*** -0.036  -0.600***
   (0.062) (0.054) (0.177)   (0.063) (0.048)  (0.169)
Distance -0.483*** -0.561*** -0.490*** -0.462*** -0.517***  -0.444***
 (0.063) (0.072) (0.076) (0.073) (0.071)  (0.076)
Corporate tax  0.004 -0.008 -0.006 0.004 -0.015  -0.009
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012)  (0.007)
Openness 0.185 0.187 0.355 0.013 0.009  0.184
 (0.136) (0.318) (0.277) (0.098) (0.327)  (0.275)
US dummy * Corruption  0.148 -0.012 0.064 0.178 0.009  0.086
 (0.142) (0.040) (0.161) (0.149) (0.039)  (0.146)
US dummy    0.006 0.722*** 0.385 -0.158 0.497**  0.219
 (0.490) (0.227) (0.466) (0.498) (0.201)  (0.413)
Intercept -4.333*** -3.602* -2.294 -3.587*** -3.275  -1.526
 (1.175) (2.090) (1.735) (1.134) (2.198)  (1.626)
OWNERSHIP MODE EQUATION                      
Firm size  0.035 -0.009 0.024 0.121*** 0.115***  0.137***
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035)  (0.032)
Production diversification  -0.057*** -0.047*** -0.053*** -0.043** -0.040* -0.044**
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022)  (0.019)
Firm R&D intensity  0.083*** 0.080*** 0.093***  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  
Firm advertising intensity  0.040*** 0.039***  0.040***
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Corruption -0.246* -0.097** -0.444***   -0.173 -0.034  -0.316**
   (0.140) (0.044) (0.091)   (0.147) (0.050)  (0.134)
Distance 0.010 0.070 0.029 -0.101 -0.107  -0.095
 (0.088) (0.098) (0.081) (0.069) (0.085)  (0.062)
US dummy * Corruption  0.569*** -0.044 0.634** 0.463* -0.109  0.386
 (0.221) (0.070) (0.293) (0.259) (0.074)  (0.305)
US dummy    -1.682** 0.403 -1.358** -1.396 0.720  -0.844
 (0.746) (0.460) (0.691) (0.952) (0.498)  (0.856)
Intercept -0.089 0.018 0.061 -1.231** -1.399***  -1.380**
 (0.520) (0.462) (0.531) (0.556) (0.541)  (0.546)
Rho -0.088 -0.312*** -0.006   -0.030 -0.107  0.046
   (0.214) (0.092) (0.113)   (0.192) (0.103)  (0.113)
No. of obs.  2808 2964 3276   3060 3230  3570
    censored  2360 2484 2791  2614 2754  3089
    uncensored  448 480 485  446 476  481
Log likelihood  -1123.871 -1268.027 -1282.724   -1158.142 -1314.133  -1322.982 
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